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Property Law.  Town of Exeter v. State, 226 A.3d 696 (R.I. 2020).  
When a zoning dispute arises between the state and a municipality 
over local land-use and zoning ordinances, the state must first 
present the project to the State Planning Council to determine 
compliance with the town’s comprehensive plan.  If the project 
garners approval, the state must then apply to the town’s zoning 
board.  From there if the parties continue to be in disagreement 
then either party may file suit to in the Rhode Island Superior 
Court to resolve the matter.  The Superior Court uses the record 
from the prior steps and applies a balancing test that examines the 
function and effect of the land-use regulations. 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In 2018, a zoning dispute arose between the towns of Exeter 
and Richmond (Towns) and the State of Rhode Island (State) over 
altering plans for the Arcadia Natural Resources and Visitors 
Center (Visitors Center).1  From 2012 through 2018, the State 
approve funding for the project as part of the annual state budget.2  
Because of its intent to use public funds for the project, the 
Department of Environmental Management (DEM) began planning 
to construct the Visitors Center in 2014.3  The detailed plans were 
posted publicly for bidding from January 2016 to November 2016, 
with a bid accepted in early 2017.4  The new building was set to be 
in an area zoned for residential use in the Town of Richmond, with 
the parking lot and other utilities in the Town of Exeter, where the 
land was zoned for open-space public land.5  
The State of Rhode Island argued that the towns were notified 
of the project between 2014 and 2015, though Exeter disputes this, 




5. Id. at 699.
2021] SURVEY SECTION 963 
arguing it was not notified until 2017.6  Twice in 2017 DEM officials 
presented the project to the Town of Richmond and allowed for 
public comment.7  It was here that the State made it clear that it 
would not agree to change the project plans.8   
On February 16, 2017, Exeter sent a cease and desist letter to 
DEM, among others, asking that the project stop until the project 
had proper permits and an administrative review had concluded.9  
Two months later on April 6, 2017, Exeter filed a petition to the 
Rhode Island Superior Court seeking a declaration that “(1) the 
project was subject to development plan review by the town; (2) the 
project required town planning board and zoning board review and 
approval; (3) the project violated environmental quality standards; 
and (4) the state failed to obtain permitting for earth removal, soil 
erosion, and drainage.”10  Richmond filed a similar action, which 
was later consolidated with the Exeter complaint, and sought a 
declaration that the State must work within the “town’s zoning 
ordinance, comprehensive plan, and subdivision regulations.”11  
On December 15, 2017, the first hearing justice found that the 
State had immunity from the Towns’ zoning ordinances, thus 
denying the Towns’ motion for a preliminary injunction.12  The 
parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the 
Towns’ requests for a declaratory judgment.13  The second hearing 
justice found that the State need not attain municipal permits or 
approval for the project and that section 45-22.2-10(g) of the Rhode 
Island Planning and Land Use Act (the Act) was the proper method 
to resolve land issues between towns and the state.14  The second 
hearing justice further explained that the Towns should adapt its 
zoning requirements to the larger project plan.15  The Superior 









14. Id. at 699–700.
15. Id. at 700.
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denied the Towns’ requests for declaratory judgment and a 
permanent injunction.16  Both towns filed appeals to the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court soon after the decision.17  The Towns 
contended that the Act should not be the proper remedy to resolve 
land-use disputes between the state and towns, but, rather, the test 
in Blackstone Park18 was more applicable because the Act applies 
only to “comprehensive-planning conflicts” while the Blackstone 
Park test governs zoning conflicts.19  The Towns also argued that 
“an outdated comprehensive plan does not invalidate local zoning 
ordinances or the ordinances’ applicability to the state and its 
agencies.”20  Conversely, the State argued that the Act was 
applicable here because neither town has an approved 
comprehensive plan, as both towns had plans that expired prior to 
June 2017, and that the Act “controls all intergovernmental land-
use disputes.”21  The State argued that because of this, the state is 
immune from the Towns’ zoning ordinances.22   
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Under Blackstone Park, the hearing court must weigh: “(1) the 
nature and scope of the instrumentality seeking immunity, (2) the 
kind of function or land use involved, (3) the extent of the public 
interest to be served, (4) the effect local land-use regulation would 
have upon the enterprise concerned and (5) the impact upon 
legitimate local interest.”23  The party whose interests outweigh the 
other’s is victorious.24  The State argued that the Act trumps the 
balancing test from Blackstone Park because the Act provides the 
proper method to resolve land-use issues between the state and 
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Blackstone Park Improvement Ass’n v. State Bd. of Standards & Ap-
peals, 448 A.2d 1233 (1982). 
19. Town of Exeter, 226 A.3d at 700.  “This Court adopted the balancing-
of-interests test to determine whether the state was immune from Providence’s 
zoning ordinance and, after applying that test, found in favor of the state.” 
(citing Blackstone Park, 448 A.2d at 1239–40).  Id. at 701.  
20. Id. at 700.
21. Id. at 700–01.
22. Id. at 701.
23. Id. (citing Blackstone Park, 448 A.2d  at 1239).
24. Id.
2021] SURVEY SECTION 965 
towns.25  The State argued that  zoning must reflect comprehensive 
planning as zoning and comprehensive planning are “inextricably 
intertwined,” and thus, the Act should govern.26  The Court 
disagreed with the State’s argument.27  
In rejecting the State’s argument, the Court relied on West v. 
McDonald, which established that zoning and comprehensive 
planning are separate schemes that address different issues that 
“may contain different, yet non-conflicting requirements.”28  The 
Court in West reasoned that “a municipality’s failure to conform its 
zoning ordinances to its comprehensive plan does not automatically 
invalidate the zoning ordinances.”29  The Court also stated that a 
plain reading of the Act does not create immunity for the state from 
a town’s zoning ordinance because the section at issue provides only 
a procedure for comprehensive planning disputes and it 
purposefully does not mention the word “zoning,” though other 
sections of the Act do.30  The Court reasoned that if the legislature 
had intended for the Act to cover comprehensive planning issues as 
well as zoning issues, zoning would have been explicitly mentioned 
in the language, thus giving deference to the statute drafter’s 
chosen words.31  Furthermore, in Town of Smithfield v. Fanning, 
the most recent case on point, the Court chose to utilize a balancing-
of-interests test as the mechanism for deciding such zoning 
disputes rather than rely on the Act.32  The Court relied on Fanning 
to support its conclusion that the Act did not supersede the 
Blackstone Park test.33   
The Court also looked at comparable law of other states and 
determined that Rhode Island is “not an outlier” in utilizing the 
balancing test for intergovernmental zoning conflicts.34  As of 2020, 
there are at least fifteen states that resolve intergovernmental 
25. Id.
26. Id. at 702.
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing West v. McDonald, 18 A.3d 526, 541 (R.I. 2011)).
29. Id. (citation omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 702–03.
32. Id. at 703.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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zoning conflicts via a balancing test.35  The Court specified that 
when the state is planning a project in a town, it must first obtain 
approval from the State Planning Council on whether the state’s 
project complies with the town’s comprehensive plan, subject to the 
guidelines in the Act.36  This is only required when a town has an 
approved comprehensive plan “at the time the state begins the 
project.”37  In the context of this dispute, the State began planning 
the project construction in 2014 during which Richmond already 
had approved a comprehensive plan that expired in June 2017.38  
When the State began to accept bids, Richmond had an approved 
comprehensive plan.39  The Court then specified that “the town was 
in compliance at the time the state should have brought the issue 
before the State Planning Council.”40  The Court held that the State 
must compare the proposed project’s compliance with Richmond’s 
comprehensive plan as it existed at the date of suit (April 12, 2017) 
for review under the process within the Act.41  The Court also held 
that although Exeter did not have a comprehensive plan, because 
of the circumstances of this case, the State must bring the issue of 
the proposed project’s compliance with Exeter’s comprehensive plan 
as it existed when Exeter filed suit for review under the procedure 
set forth in the Act.42 
The Towns further argued that the state must apply to the 
town zoning board before bringing an action in Superior Court so 
that the trial justice can employ a balancing test of the interests of 
the state against that of the town.43  In Blackstone Park, the Court 
held that the state should “consult with” and “sympathetically 










44. Id. (citing Blackstone Park Improvement Ass’n v. State Bd. of Stand-
ards & Appeals, 448 A.2d 1233, 1239 (1982)). 
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best done through following the town’s zoning ordinance.45  This 
method has been adopted by the majority of jurisdictions that use 
the balancing test to resolve these disputes, which also ensures 
these disputes are resolved as cost-efficiently as possible.46   
Thus, the Court  held that when a conflict arises between a 
state and a municipality on local land-use and zoning ordinances, 
the state must first present the project to the State Planning 
Council to determine compliance with the town’s comprehensive 
plan.47  If the project is approved, the state is required to apply to 
the town’s zoning board for “zoning relief and act in conformity with 
the procedures set forth in the Zoning Enabling Act.”48  Only then, 
if the parties remain in disagreement, can either party file suit in 
the Superior Court, which will then use the record from both prior 
procedural steps and apply Blackstone Park’s balancing test to 
“resolve the matter.”49 
COMMENTARY 
In deciding this case, the Court carefully analyzed the plain 
language of the Act to note that it did not supersede the balancing 
test.  The absence of the word “zoning” in the referenced section of 
the Act is significant when the rest of the Act uses the word where 
necessary.50  It is generally important to note where the legislature 
purposefully omitted a word, compared to where the legislature 
explicitly and purposefully included a word.  Interestingly, the 
Court opted to uphold a balancing test rather than hold that the 
Act confers immunity on the state from municipal zoning 
ordinances.51 
The Court also looked at the law in other states to determine if 
the Blackstone Park balancing test was unique.  While states may 
have different rules and regulations, the Court found that at least 
fifteen other states use a balancing test to resolve 
45. Id. (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 704–05 (quoting Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish, & Game
Comm’n, 675 P.2d 230, 236 (Kan. 1978)). 
47. Id. at 705.
48. Id. at 705–06.
49. Id. at 706.
50. See id. at 702.
51. See id. at 706.
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intergovernmental zoning conflicts.52  Intergovernmental zoning 
disputes are not unique to Rhode Island.53  The Court’s survey of 
other state laws and practices helped support the decision to utilize 
a balancing test.54  
In determining the test for future disputes, the Court created 
a precedent for future zoning disagreements, which will 
undoubtedly increase judicial efficiency.55  The holding in this case 
also serves an evidentiary function, as it creates a record of the 
interactions of the parties for the reviewing justices to consider.  
The process set out by the Court will then streamline the 
proceedings and increase predictability and uniformity among 
disputes of this nature.  In the future, similar disputes will be 
subject to the holding in this case, and the precedent created here 
provides a clear rule as to how the courts should resolve such 
disputes.  
CONCLUSION 
The Court held that the plain language of  section 45-22.2-10(g) 
of the Act does not outline the method for “intergovernmental 
tension and comprehensive planning to zoning disputes.”56  The 
Court also outlined the manner in which disputes should be 
resolved.57  The Court remanded the case to the State Planning 
Council to “without delay, conduct the formal administrative 
hearing concerning the state’s compliance with the towns’ 
comprehensive plans, as the plans existed at the time each town 
filed suit in Superior Court.”58  
 Madalyn E. McGunagle 
52. Id. at 703.
53. Id. 706.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 705–06.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 706.
58. Id.
